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Abstract
In a number of countries, women married to unemployed men have lower 
participation rates in paid work than do wives of employed men - the reverse 
situation of that suggested by the added worker effect. One possibility is 
that the employment status of the husband proxies characteristics of the wife 
associated with a low probability of her being employed. Another is that the 
labour supply of the wife may be affected by the type of unemployment benefit 
received by her husband, a disincentive effect arising when this benefit is 
means-tested on family income. We investigate these issues using panel data 
on married women in Germany covering five years. The panel nature of the data 
is used to control for unobservable fixed-effects which may be correlated with 
the husband's employment status and type of benefit if unemployed. We 
estimate the Chamberlain fixed-effect logit model using a two-stage technique 
for a panel with 60 periods. This technique avoids the excessive 
computational burden that arises with the use of a single stage conditional 
maximum likelihood approach when panels have more than a few periods.
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What effect should the unemployment of one member of a family have on 
the labour supply of other members? The textbook discussion emphasises the 
possibility of an "added-worker" impact, this increasing the labour supply of 
other family members through an income effect. On this basis we would expect 
women married to unemployed men to have a higher labour force participation 
rate than women married to men who are employed. In fact, in a variety of 
countries the opposite is the case; women married to unemployed men often have 
lower participation rates. Table 1 shows the position for 11 countries; the 
participation rate in employment for the wives of unemployed men is 
significantly lower than for wives of working men at the one percent level on 
a chi-square test in 7 of the 11 countries and at the five percent level in 
one other. In no country is a significant pattern of the opposite kind found. 
In a number of countries the participation rate where the husband is 
unemployed is dramatically lower, and only in the USA (among those countries 
where the difference is significant) is the difference less than ten percent 
points.
Table 1
Labour Force Participation Rates of Women aged 20-54 



























Notes: 1) * indicates that 'unemployed' includes all husbands not working.
2) ** and * indicate that the chi-square test statistic derived from 
a 2 X 2 table for each country is significant at the 1 and 5 percent 
level respectively.
Source: Luxembourg Income Study microdata (this source is described in 




























































































Of course, there are a number of possible reasons for the pattern in 
Table 1 which are consistent with the separate operation of an added worker 
effect. In particular, low participation rates may be the result of 
characteristics which are more common among the wives of the unemployed than 
among the wives of employed men such as low productivity and residence in 
areas of low labour demand.1 An issue with which we are particularly 
concerned in this paper is whether the employment status of the wife is 
affected by the type of unemployment benefit received by her husband 
(something that is not typically allowed for in the textbook discussion of 
unemployment and family labour supply). A disincentive effect for married 
women may be expected if unemployment benefits paid to their husbands are 
means-tested on family income, i.e. if benefits payable to an unemployed man 
are reduced when his wife has earned income. If this effect is important in 
practice then the policy choice between different types of unemployment 
benefits needs to make allowance for the labour supply effects on the whole 
family. This may put benefits which are not means-tested in a good light, 
such as the typical unemployment insurance benefit (Atkinson and Micklewright, 
forthcoming).
The possible disincentives to family labour supply that may stem from 
the unemployment benefit system have been paid relatively little attention. 
An exception occurs in the UK (e.g. Garcia 1989 and 1991, Dilnot and Kell 
1989, Kell and Wright 1990) where the most important unemployment benefit (in 
terms of numbers of recipients at any one time) is means-tested on family 
income; the earnings of secondary earners are subject to an implicit 100 
percent marginal rate of tax over a substantial range of hours. It is 
tempting to point to other countries in Table 1 and speculate as to whether 
the figures in the table reflect their benefit systems. For example, all 
unemployment benefit is subject to a family means-test in Australia; in the 
other countries in the table there is a "first-line" of income support 
provided by unemployment insurance, more or less free of a family means-test 
in every case. And Australia has both the lowest participation rate for wives 
of unemployed men of any country in the table and the greatest difference in 
rates between these wives and wives of employed men. On the other hand, there
In addition spouses' leisure consumption may be complementary. 
Lundberg (1985) argues that within a life-cycle the added-worker effect should 
be important only in the presence of credit constraints provided that the 




























































































are countries in Table 1 where the wives of unemployed men have a lower 
participation rate but relatively little unemployment benefit is means-tested 
e.g. Canada and the US.
Progress in explaining participation rates for the wives of unemployed 
men can only be made by examining microdata in more detail. In what follows 
we analyse microdata from Germany. We choose this country for two reasons. 
Firstly, Germany, like the UK, is a country in which part of the unemployment 
benefit system is means-tested on family income and the disincentive outlined 
above may be expected to operate for the wives of some unemployed men 
(although the difference between participation rates of women married to 
employed and to unemployed men is not nearly as great as in the UK - see Table 
1). Secondly, there are available panel data recording the labour force 
status of married couples for a substantial period; we exploit the panel 
nature of the data by allowing for unobserved fixed-effects which might be 
correlated with the husband's employment and benefit status. This cannot be 
done with cross-section data; despite the use of numerous control variables 
determining the wife's employment probability the possibility of omitted 
variable bias on the coefficients relating to the husband's status would 
always be present. In this context it may be noted that all three studies 
from the UK referred to above used cross-section data (as does that of 
Maloney, 1991, notwithstanding the title of the paper).2
Section 2 describes the relevant institutional features of the 
unemployment benefit system in Germany and our data; we use a sample of some 
2,000 German couples drawn from the Socio-Economic Panel (SEP) for whom we 
observe the labour force status of each partner for 60 consecutive months 
spanning 1983-7. In Section 3 we estimate a binary model of the probability 
that the wife is employed in a given month, treating her husband's employment 
status as (strictly) exogenous. We attempt to establish whether the lower 
participation rate of wives of the unemployed is significantly associated with 
the unemployment benefit system or whether it is due to other observable 
characteristics together with unobservable influences. To this end we 
estimate the Chamberlain fixed-effect logit model. We present a two-stage 
technique for this model which avoids the excessive computational burden that 
arises with the use of the conditional maximum likelihood approach when panels
While writing up this research our attention was drawn to the work 
of Davies et al (1989) which does use panel data (from the UK) but which 




























































































have more than a few periods. Section 4 contains results and Section 5 
concludes.
2. German Unemployment Benefits and Panel Data
What influence might the institutional details of unemployment benefits 
received by the husband in Germany be expected to have on the labour supply 
of the wife? Income support for the German unemployed is provided by three 
programmes. Eligibility for Unemployment Insurance ("Arbeitslosengeld") 
depends on the past employment history of the claimant and receipt is 
unaffected by any labour earnings of other persons in the family. Of limited 
duration, Unemployment Insurance (UI) pays 63% of previous net earnings.
Unemployment Assistance ("Arbeitslosenhilfe") is payable either on the 
expiry of UI or if no eligibility for UI exists (in the latter case there is 
a minimal employment history requirement). Unemployment Assistance (UA) is 
means-tested at a rate of 100% on family income although the first DM150 per 
week (in 1989) of any income of the spouse (plus an additional DM70 for each 
child) is disregarded for the purpose of the means-test. Above the disregard, 
the net contribution to family income of the wife's labour supply is zero 
until her earnings in excess of_, the disregard equal her husband's UA 
entitlement. UA is also related to past earnings, with a replacement rate of 
56%. If both husband and wife faced the average industrial hourly wage for 
their respective sexes, the 100% implicit marginal tax rate would have applied 
to the wife throughout the range 10-48 hours in 1989 if there were no children 
(assuming the husband had previously worked 40 hours per week and no other 
income present).3 This indicates that the disincentive from the UA means-test 
may bind for a wide range of hours (the precise range depending on wages and 
family characteristics including other income).
The third benefit is Social Assistance ("Sozialhilfe") which is a 
residual means-tested benefit administered and paid for by local authorities; 
all of the spouse's earnings would be included in the calculation. Unlike UA, 
Social Assistance (SA) can be received at the same time as UI if sufficient 
need can be demonstrated. It can also supplement UA. Such "top-up" payments 
are rare if UI is in receipt; in 1985 only 5% of the unemployed with SA were
The average female hourly industrial wage in 1989 was DM14.76 per 
hour and that for men DM 20.09 (Statistisches Jahrbuch 1990. p .504). The 





























































































also receiving UI while another 24% had UA payments (Brinkmann, 1988, table 
18).
In 1986, 64% of the total inflow (men and women) into registered 
unemployment received UI and 12% UA only; in the unemployed stock, exactly the 
same proportion of men were receiving the two benefits: 36%; in 1985 some 13% 
of the registered stock were in receipt of SA (Brinkmann, 1988, tables 2 and 
5).
The data we use to shed more light on the participation of the wives of 
unemployed men are drawn from the first five annual waves of the German Socio- 
Economic Panel (SEP); the first wave took place in 1984, interviewing some 
5,000 households. In each wave respondents are asked to indicate their labour 
force status in each month in the preceding calendar year. We select a sample 
of 2,021 women continuously married throughout the 60 months concerned (and 
with their husband present in the household), aged 20-57 at interview in the 
first wave.* The overall participation rate of the married women in the 
sample changes very little during the five years but there are substantial 
changes in participation at the individual level; 26% of the women started 
work at least once in the period, 25% ceased working at least once, and 34% 
did one or the other, i.e. changed employment status.
In addition to the 2,021 women continuously married who we include, 
there are 438 women present in all five waves who are married for only part 
of the period. These we exclude. It should be noted however that since male 
unemployment may have an impact on marriage itself (e.g. Jensen and Smith, 
1990) there may be an indirect influence on female participation as a result; 
by excluding those persons not continuously married we are in effect 
conditioning on the stability of marriage. We may also note that although the 
sub-sample we use represents a balanced panel the exclusion of those not 
continuously married or who do not respond in all waves is not in fact 
required by our econometric model; this could equally accommodate an 
unbalanced panel as we explain below. (We also exclude 59 continuously 
married women whose husbands did not respond to the survey in one or more 
years.)
About one-third of persons (men and women) interviewed in the 




































































































Status Missing (0.3%) 41.7
Note: the figures in brackets refer to the percentage of the total 120,568 
observed months in which the husbands have the employment status indicated. 
These months relate to 2,021 couples (we have dropped those months in which 
the wives' employment status was missing). Participation of the wife is 
defined as paid employment.
Table 2 shows the labour force status of husbands and wives in the total 
of more than 120,000 months observed in the sample (the unit of analysis in 
the table is the month). Husbands are unemployed in less than four percent 
of these months, although given the large sample (in dimension N by T) this 
represents over 4,000 observations. When the husbands are unemployed their 
wives have a participation rate in paid work which is 6.7 percent points less 
than when the husbands are employed, a difference which given the sample size 
is not surprisingly significant at any conventional level on a chi-square 
test.5
In Table 3 we focus on the months in which the husbands were unemployed 
and look at how the wives' labour force status varies with the type of benefit 
received by the husband. In addition to the retrospective collection of 
twelve months of employment status data in each sweep of the panel, 
respondents who have been unemployed are also asked to indicate in which 
months they received UI and in which UA. Unfortunately, no question is asked
This pattern is not inconsistent with Table 1 where the hypothesis 
of identical participation rates for wives of employed and unemployed men 
could not be rejected for Germany; the sample in Table 2 is far larger, being 
based on 60 observations for each couple rather than a single observation as 





























































































about Social Assistance. Table 3 shows UA in receipt in a third of the 
observed months in our data.
Table 3
Wife's Labour Force Status in Months when Husband is Unemployed 
bv Husband's Unemployment Benefit Type
Husband receiving:
Unemployment Insurance (UI) 
[not means-tested]
Unemployment Assistance (UA) 
[means-tested]









Note: The percentages in the table are based on a sample of 4,270 months. See 
also notes to Table 2.
Conditional on the husband being unemployed, there are marked 
differences in the wife's employment status associated with the type of 
benefit he receives. The lowest participation rate - less than 30% - occurs 
where the husband is receiving UA; the highest participation rate - over 70% 
- is where neither UI nor UA is in receipt. Further investigation showed that 
the proportion of those participating who reported themselves as being in 
full-time work was lowest where UA was in payment to the husband and highest 
where neither UI nor UA was being received. Superficially, this evidence 
might appear consistent with both an added-worker effect when no benefit is 
received, and a means-test disincentive if UA is in payment, especially to 
full-time work. The lack of information in the data on Social Assistance 
payments makes it difficult however to read much into the situation where 
neither UI nor UA are received. More fundamentally, there may of course be 
no causal relationship between the participation rate and UA; the receipt of 




























































































revealed by multivariate analysis, to which we now turn.
3. Estimating the Participation Probability
We model the probability that the wives in our sample participate in 
paid work under the assumption that the husband's employment and benefit 
statuses are strictly exogenous (this rules out the need to model jointly the 
employment status of husband and wife). Armed with this assumption, one way 
to proceed would be to estimate a two state - employment and other - discrete 
time duration model in which the husband's employment status and type of 
unemployment benefit entered as time-varying covariates/ We adopt a 
different (and simpler) approach, estimating a panel data version of the 
familiar reduced form binary choice model.7 This keeps us closest to the 
descriptive analysis used so far in the paper on which we wish to throw more 
light; for the same reason we adopt a static framework.8 Our aim is to show 
whether econometric analysis of panel data confirms descriptive analysis 
rather than to estimate a full behavioural model of the participation 
decision.
Let:
Y„ = X„'b + Z/d + a, + u1t (1)
where we observe 
D,t = 1 if Y„> 0 
- 0 otherwise
Lundberg (1985) considers the added worker effect using a three 
state duration model but imposes stationarity on the hazard.
We do not pursue the full-time/part-time distinction further in 
this paper because recorded information appears to be based on the 
respondents' own definitions of these states rather than on any firm criterion 
of hours of work. We thus avoid the problem of whether the hours decision is 
determined in a different way to the participation decision.
It is worth noting that provided we wish to estimate the 
parameters of time-varying characteristics, parameters relating to lagged 
values of the wife's employment status could not in any case be estimated with 
the conditional logit approach we describe below (Narendranathan and Elias 
1990). A structural model in which we attempted to model budget constraints 
in detail is, in our view, beyond the ability of the data source which 




























































































and where D,t = 1 if individual i is employed in period t and zero 
otherwise. The vectors X)t and the Z, are observed and we allow for the 
existence of an unobserved individual specific time-invariant a, as well as 
an I ID error term u„. Our data provides t = 1..60 observations on each i = 
1..1,885 individuals.5
Our interest is in estimating the parameters b, i.e. coefficients of 
time-varying characteristics Xjt such as the husband's employment status and 
his type of unemployment benefit. In doing so we .wish to allow for the 
possibility that the unobserved a, are correlated with the Xft; this is our 
reason for using panel data. Is the low participation rate of wives whose 
husbands receive UA a result of this type of benefit proxying other 
characteristics which lower participation rates and which we do not observe 
and thus cannot condition on in X1t and Zt?
To estimate the b in the presence of possibly correlated fixed-effects 
an appropriate technique (which places only mild restrictions on the a,) is 
the conditional likelihood approach suggested by Chamberlain (1980) in which 
a logistic functional form for p(D,t=l) is assumed. As with any fixed-effect 
model, the coefficients of observed time-invariant characteristics, d,, cannot 
be estimated with this approach. This is not a worry since these 
characteristics are of no real interest to us. But a very real problem for 
the present exercise does exist with the Chamberlain model.
The computational burden for the conditional logit likelihood function 
rises sharply with T, the length of the panel (see e.g. Maddala 1987 pp316-7). 
A sufficient statistic for the unobserved a, is the sum of D„ over the length 
of the panel; conditioning on this sum the a, drops out of the expression for 
the conditional probability of the observed sequence of D„ for individual i 
(as do the observed fixed characteristics, d,). There are T-l possible sums 
which need to be considered. With T=3 the observed sequence of Dit over the 
panel for any individual will take one of any six possible forms, and with T=4 
there are fourteen forms (leaving aside in both cases the uninformative 
sequences in which the individual occupies the same state in each period). 
For general T, there are (2T-2) possible sequences which may be observed and 
this presents a formidable computational hurdle as a number of authors have
We exclude from the econometric analysis 136 women for whom 
employment status is missing in one or more of the 60 months. (For the 





























































































noted. For example, Greene (1990) comments that the amount of computation 
"becomes excessive for T larger than five or six" (p.687) and his well-known 
LIMDEP package imposes a limit of T=5 on the user.
Estimation of the conditional logit model by maximum likelihood in a 
single step using all our data with T=60 is clearly infeasible. In principle, 
one solution would be to use only a small sample of time-periods in 
estimation. However, it should be remembered that in only a small percent of 
months in our data is any unemployment of the husband recorded (see Table 2) 
and in addition some of the men concerned may be married to women who have the 
same employment status in each period - some two-thirds of the sample - who 
can in any case contribute nothing to the likelihood of the conditional logit 
model. For reasons of efficiency in estimation of the b therefore, we do need 
to estimate the model with all our data.
We overcome this apparent dilemma with a simple two-stage estimation 
technique which could be used by anyone wishing to estimate the Chamberlain 
model with non-trivia! T. We divide our 60 months of SEP data into 12 smaller 
panels, each with T=5; the January months (one from each of the five years) 
form one panel, the February months another, and so on. The 12 small panels 
are therefore overlapping. At the first stage we then obtain 12 sets of 
estimates of the b vector and their associated variance-covariance matrices 
by maximising the conditional likelihood for the Chamberlain model for each 
panel. At the second stage we use minimum distance to impose equality 
restrictions on these b vectors and in addition obtain an estimate of the 
variance-covariance matrix of the new restricted parameter estimates. In this 
way we avoid discarding data.10
Let p be the number of time-varying characteristics in Xit, B the stack 
of the 12 estimated b, and G the estimates which we wish to obtain of the 
equality restricted b; B has dimensions 12pxl and G, pxl. More specifically,
The use of minimum distance at a second stage has been used to 
overcome problems of large microdata sets in another context by Browning and 
Meghir (1991). They estimate a demand system equation by equation in a first 
stage then use minimum distance to impose the cross-equation restrictions 
dictated by economic theory at a second stage. We thank Costas Meghir for 
suggesting the technique to us. In principle the technique is not fully 
efficient in our case since it may not use all the data. Eor example, if a 
woman participates in all the January months but never in any other month she 
would contribute to the conditional likelihood of a model with T=60 but will 
not contribute to the likelihood of any of the 12 panels we construct with 





























































































the second stage involves obtaining estimates of the restricted parameters G 
by estimating the relationship B = KG + e, by generalised least squares. The 
matrix K is a stack of 12 identity matrices, each with dimension pxp; K 
defines the equality restrictions on the b. Thus we obtain G by:
G = (K'V 'K) ‘K'V ‘B (2)
The matrix V'1 is formed from the 12 estimated variance-covariance 
matrices from the first stage. Under the assumption of a static model there 
are no covariances between any two parameter estimates taken from a pair of 
b vectors obtained from different first stage (T=5) panels. This allows V'1 
to be formed as a block-diagonal matrix of dimension 12pxl2p with the inverses 
of the first-stage estimated variance-covariance matrices down the leading 
diagonal (and all other elements zero). These estimates of G will give a 
minimised chi-squared value equal to (G - KB)'V‘‘(G - KB) with lip degrees of 
freedom which may be used as a test of the equality restrictions on the first 
stage b estimates. An estimate of the variance-covariance matrix of the G is 
given by (K'V’K)'1.
We noted in Section 2 that although we do use a balanced panel this is 
not in fact required by our econometric model. Consider, for example, those 
married couples who are observed for only three waves of the panel, implying 
a maximum of T=36. We could split these data up and estimate 12 first-stage 
models with T=3 (there are obviously other ways of splitting) in addition to 
the 12 with T=5. Second stage estimation would then proceed with B as a stack 
of 24 rather than 12 first-stage b estimates and with dimensions of other 
matrices also adjusted (for example V 1 would contain 24 inverses of stage one 
variance-covariance matrices). The point is that the length of any group of 
observations in the panel is no longer important at the second stage. All 
such problems can be dealt with at the first stage by obtaining separate 
estimates of b for each group that differs in T.
4. Results
Columns 4 and 5 of Table 4 give results obtained with the two-stage 
"conditional maximum likelihood - generalised least squares" (CML/GLS) 
technique described in the last section. The estimates in columns 1-3 are 
obtained with maximum likelihood (ML) under the assumption that the combined 




























































































using the N times T observations as a giant cross-section (of 113,100 
observations) and applying the familiar binary logit model to the data. In 
other words, we ignore the possible correlation of fixed effects with 
observables which is allowed for when we obtain the CML/GLS results. This 
provides a bench-mark against which we can assess the importance of unobserved 
fixed effects." In contrast to the CML/GLS technique this model provides 
estimates of the d, the parameters of the time invariant characteristics, as 
well as estimates of the b. We include in Z, a variety of characteristics 
which are entered in the specification in column 3. These are listed at the 
bottom of the table but the parameter estimates are not reported since they 
hold no interest for the purpose of this paper; our aim is merely to see how 
the estimated b in columns 1 and 2 change when we include a number of 
observable characteristics of the women. (These characteristics are entirely 
conventional for a reduced form participation equation.)
Time-varying characteristics include the variables relating to the 
husband's employment status and benefit receipt in which we are particularly 
interested. The assumption of strict exogeneity of these variables is a 
severe one. The use in this way of the employment status dummies1 implies that 
the wife takes the labour supply of the husband as given; we therefore make 
no recognition in our model of the large literature on other types of family 
decision making model. In the case of the benefit status variables we show 
in Table 4 the results of using a single dummy for UA, the category of benefit 
receipt associated with the lowest wives' participation rate and which implies 
a flat portion of the wife's budget constraint over a range of hours (assuming 
pooling of family income). It should be noted that this variable may not in 
principle be exogenous to the wife's participation decision; a wife working 
long hours could extinguish the UA entitlement. We return to this problem 
later. The other variables in X,t are the regional (Lander) unemployment rate 
(time variation is annual) entered to pick up demand side effects, and a 
number of variables relating to the age and numbers of children (these may 
alter monthly). The time-invariant characteristics in column 3 are dummies 
indicating birth cohort, education and nationality. The SEP over-samples 
foreigners with the result that some 30% of our sample are not German natives.
The assumption of a multivariate logistic distribution for [a, + 
uit] is inherently unattractive and is made only to have a bench-mark logit 
model. If a, is a random effect uncorrelated with included observables then 
a less restrictive assumption would be multivariate normal (see Maddala, 1987, 




























































































We include a different set of educational variables for foreigners (the base 
for the education dummies is the lowest level of German education) together 
with nationality dummies.
The results in columns 1 and 2 reflect the earlier descriptives 
statistics in Tables 2 and 3 and provide a bench-mark against which to assess 
the effect of introducing further explanatory variables and of allowing for 
unobservables. Column 1 shows the lower on average participation rate of 
wives of the unemployed (the base for the dummies is an employed husband). 
Column 2 shows that in the presence of just those variables representing the 
employment status of the husband, the receipt by him of means-tested UA is 
associated with a significantly lower probability of the wife working, 
amounting to a maximum of about 20 percent points.12 As with the earlier 
descriptive analysis these effects have been found without controlling for 
other characteristics of the women concerned and in column 3 we introduce a 
range of those which we can observe but we continue to ignore the existence 
of the unobserved fixed-effect a,. Only the coefficients of the additional 
time-varying X„ are reported. Not surprisingly, these have a considerable 
impact. One child aged 0-5 reduces the participation probability by up to 25- 
30 percent points. The regional (Lander) unemployment rate varies during the 
period from about 5% in Baden-Württemberg to over 15% in Bremen; its estimated 
coefficient implies that this variation is associated with a difference in the 
participation probability of up to 20 percent points.
Two features of the differences in the results between columns 2 and 3 
may be noted. Firstly, the significantly negative coefficient on husband's 
UA does not disappear although its size is reduced by about one quarter. This 
suggests that only a part of the impact of this variable in column 2 
represented the effects of characteristics for which we now control in column 
3. In other words, the lower probability of the wife working when the husband 
receives UA is only to a minor degree explained by the unemployment rate of 
the region in which she lives, together with her birth cohort, human capital, 
number and ages of children, and nationality. Secondly, when we control for 
such characteristics, husband's unemployment per se is associated with a 
slightly higher probability of participation, around 8 percent points at the
With the logit functional form the derivative of the probability 
of participation, P, with respect to an explanatory variable X with 
coefficient b is given by dP/dX = P(l-P)b. Division of each coefficient by 





























































































The results in columns 1-3 are obtained under the assumption that the 
unobserved a, is uncorrelated with included explanatory variables. Not only 
does this seem improbable a priori but the change in the coefficients of our 
principal variables of interest between columns 2 and 3 is informal evidence 
against the assumption. It seems unlikely that we have controlled in column 
3 for all possible influences on participation which might be correlated with 
the dummies for husband's employment status and UA receipt. The fixed-effects 
model estimated by the two-stage technique, the results from which are 
reported in columns 4 and 5, allows for the a, to be correlated with included 
variables.
The null hypothesis of equality of first stage b coefficients cannot be 
rejected; the minimised chi-squared values reported in columns 4 and 5 are 
distributed with 33 and 99 degrees of freedom respectively. (This rejection 
of the null is not surprising given the overlapping scheme we used to 
construct the short stage one panels.) The Hausman statistics for the 
significance of fixed effects given at the bottom of columns 4 and 5 are also 
chi-squared statistics, with 3 and 9 degrees of freedom respectively; both 
show the importance of allowing for fixed effects (the size of the statistic 
in column 5 is driven by the big change in the estimated impact of the age of 
the youngest child.) The following conclusions can be drawn from these 
results concerning the impact of allowing for the fixed-effects.
1. There appears to be no significant association of husband's unemployment 
per se with the wife's participation status. This is shown most simply by the 
results in column 4 where we include no additional observable characteristics 
to the husband's employment status variables; allowing for unobservables 
results in the disappearance of the significant negative coefficient on 
husband's unemployment in column 1. Likewise the significant positive 
coefficient in column 3 is not present in column 5.
2. Women with a husband out of the labour force do have a lower probability 
of participation, by up to 10-12 percent points. This association in the data 
in the descriptive analysis survives after allowance is made for both 
observables and unobservables.




























































































in the cross-section approach: the allowance for fixed-effects increases (in 
absolute size) all but one of the coefficients concerned, very markedly in the 
case of the variable relating to the age of the youngest child (something 
worthy of more investigation). This contrasts with the findings of Jakubson 
(1988) for the US (it should be noted that Jakubson uses the Tobit 
specification rather than a binary model).
4. The regional unemployment rate maintains its negative impact, the 
coefficient increasing in absolute size. This would appear to confirm the 
presence of important demand side effects on the participation probability. 
(This variable displays much less temporal than regional variation during the 
period in question, hence the large drop in the precision of the estimated 
coefficient).
4. The estimated coefficient of the dummy indicating a husband on UA is not 
driven down to zero. There is in fact a slight increase from column 3 and the 
value is only 15% lower than in column 2 where there are no controls at all; 
the null hypothesis that the true parameter is zero is rejected at 
conventional significance levels. (In a specification identical to that in 
column 2 the coefficient on UA is almost identical to that in column 5.) The 
apparent implication is that the lower participation rate of wives of men 
receiving means-tested unemployment benefit is only to a small degree 
explained by observable and unobservable characteristics of the wife which are 
correlated with her husband's benefit status. It should however be noted that 
with the size of sample concerned, the relevant parameter in column 5 cannot 
be considered as being determined with very great precision.
We noted earlier that in principle the UA dummy is endogenous. If the 
wife works long hours she can extinguish her husband's UA entitlement; the 
negative association between the wife's participation probability and the 
husband's UA status could reflect causality running in this direction, rather 
than from UA to participation as we have hypothesised. This issue requires 
our attention in future work. Here we merely report the results of using a 
dummy variable indicating that the husband receives UI, which is not subject 
to a means-test, in place of the dummy indicating means-tested UA receipt. 
This variable does not suffer from the same problem of endogeneity and it 




























































































relative to a base of means-tested UA or no benefit since the receipt of UI 
by the husband is a clear indication that there can be no potential UA 
disincentive operating (receipt of UI rules out eligibility for UA). After 
controlling for both observables and unobservables (using the specification 
of these other influences in column 5) we obtain an estimated coefficient on 
the husband's UI dummy of -0.162 (standard error 0.180). This appears to be 





























































































Logit Parameter Estimates of Probability of Wife Working
Cross Section Fixed Effect
Single-Stage Two-Stage
ML CML/GLS
1 2 3 4 5





Unemployed -0.189 0.077 0.335 -0.014 -0.001
(5.8) (0.1) (7.8) (0.1) (0.1)
Out of labour force -0.084 -0.083 0.104 -0.434 -0.517
(3.4) (3.4) (3.9) (4.5) (5.3)
employment status missing -0.276 -0.276 -0.190 -0.135 -0.177
(2.3) (2.3) (1.6) (0.5) (0.6)
getting Unemployment -0.870 -0.644 -0.737
Assistance (UA) (12.1) (8.3) (3.8)
Lander Unemolovment rate 1%) -0.086 -0.145
(32.0) (4.9)
Children:
Number aged 0-5 -1.114 -1.148
(69.1) (20.4)
Number aged 6-15 -0.499 -0.437
(45.7) (8.2)
Number aged 16+ -0.116 -0.290
(11.6) (4.9)
Age of Youngest (months/12) 0.009 0.102
(7.5) (14.0)
Fixed Characteristics (Z,) NO YES -- --
-Log-Likelihood (single stage ML) 78,199 78,122 71,601 -- --
Chi-squared test of equality of 
first stage estimates (CML/GLS)
-- -- -- 9.6 51.8
Hausman test of fixed effects -- -- 19.9 255.8
Note: 1) log-likelihood with constant only in ML model = -78,224.
2) t-statistics in brackets
3) Fixed Characteristics (Z,) included in the specification in column 3: five dummies 
for year of wife's birth (1935-39, 1940-44, 1945-49, 1950-54, 1955+), twelve dummies for 
wife's education (education record missing, German intermediate, German Upper secondary 
school, German professional college, German university, foreign compulsory without 
qualification, foreign compulsory with qualification, foreign further Schooling, foreign 
Professional School, foreign university, foreign vocational training, foreign no 






























































































In this paper we have considered the effect of unemployment experienced 
by a married man on his wife's labour supply. An econometric investigation 
was undertaken to shed more light on suggestive results from descriptive 
analysis. We have assumed the husband's employment status to be exogenous and 
have paid particular attention to the type of unemployment benefit he 
receives. Using a two-stage technique because of the computational burden 
posed by a long panel we estimated a static binary model of participation with 
German household data allowing for unobservable fixed effects correlated with 
observables.
The results of the model suggest that there could be a disincentive 
impact on family labour supply from the means-testing of UA. Such a 
disincentive would be predicted by a static theoretical model of labour- 
leisure choice. However, in reality the disincentive from the UA system is 
temporary, lasting only as long as the husband continues to be unemployed. 
A dynamic theoretical model can explain why women work despite the UA system 
posing a large disincentive (Dustmann and Micklewright, 1991).
Women in Germany married to unemployed men may have a participation rate 
which is in part influenced by the institutional details of the German 
unemployment benefit system (and their husband's employment status), although 
our results have also indicated the importance of demand side factors. Any 
firmer conclusions concerning this important issue - which concerns the 
unemployment benefit systems in other countries too - would require more 
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